Anadolu Agency – October 15, 2024
Gaza death toll jumps to 42,344 as Israel kills 55 more Palestinians
Over 99,000 Palestinians injured in Israeli onslaught since Oct. 7, 2023, Gaza's Health Ministry says
Israeli attacks killed at least 55 more Palestinians in the Gaza Strip, bringing the overall death toll since last year to 42,344, the Health Ministry in the enclave said on Tuesday.
A ministry statement added that some 99,013 others were injured in the ongoing assault.
“Israeli forces killed 55 people and injured 329 others in four massacres of families in the last 24 hours,” the ministry said.
“Many people are still trapped under the rubble and on the roads as rescuers are unable to reach them,” it added.
Flouting a UN Security Council resolution calling for an immediate cease-fire, Israel has continued its brutal offensive on the Gaza Strip since an attack by the Palestinian group Hamas on Oct. 7, 2023.
The Israeli onslaught has displaced almost the entire population of the territory amid an ongoing blockade that has led to severe shortages of food, clean water, and medicine.
Mediation efforts led by the US, Egypt, and Qatar to reach a Gaza cease-fire and prisoner swap agreement between Israel and Hamas have failed over Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu's refusal to halt the war.
Israel also faces a genocide case at the International Court of Justice for its actions in Gaza.
What is Khalistan, the source of tensions between Canada and India?
The demand for a separate Sikh state of Khalistan in India and New Delhi's alleged involvement in assassination of dissidents had morphed into a diplomatic crisis with Canada.
India and Canada have expelled each other's ambassadors and five other top diplomats after New Delhi said its envoy had been named among "persons of interest" in the investigations into the killing of a Sikh separatist leader last year
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New Delhi said it was withdrawing its six diplomats from Canada, but an Ottawa government source told AFP they had been expelled, not withdrawn.
The 2023 murder of Canadian citizen Hardeep Singh Nijjar marred the country's diplomatic relations with India after Prime Minister Justin Trudeau said there were "credible allegations" linking Indian intelligence services to the crime.
The expulsion of the Indian diplomats is a major escalation in the row.
Khalistan-linked separatists have fled India and become prominent in Canadian politics.
But what is Khalistan, and why has it become a source of tension between the two countries?
Jarnail Singh Bhindrawale
In 1977, Sant Jarnail Singh Bhindrawale became a popular figure among Sikhs in India's Punjab. This also coincided with the rise of a sect called Nirankaris, which Puritan Sikhs considered a syncretic sect.
In 1978, riots erupted between Nirankaris and Puritan Sikhs, which killed sixteen.
The Sikhs led by Bhindrawale perceived that Nirankaris were being actively supported by New Delhi to undermine their religious and political identity.
By 1980, Sikh separatism had begun to creep up slowly, with many separatist leaders calling for a separate Sikh Nation – Khalistan, as the Indian government refused to entertain the idea of granting more autonomy to Punjab.
In November 1982, theﾠAsian games hosted by India became the flash point of protest and controversy, with Sikh organisations taking the protest to playing fields.
The Indian government responded by treating all Sikhs as suspects,ﾠwith even elected parliamentarians not spared, frisked and arrested.
In 1983, Presidential rule was imposed in Punjab and elected assembly was dissolved as violence surged and political tensions escalated.
Operation Blue Star
The holiest Sikh place, the Golden Temple located in Amritsar, became a rallying point for Sikh separatists. Bhindrawale, along with his supporters, camped on its premises.
In the first week of June 1984, Golden Temple was surrounded by Indian troops and on June 6th, the premises were stormed in by the Indian army, resulting in hundreds of deaths, including that of Bhindrawale and some of his followers.
The army operation named “Blue Star” that badly damaged the Golden Temple caused outrage among the Sikhs and led to further alienation and militancy that culminated in the assassination of then-Indian Prime Minister Indira Gandhi by her Sikh bodyguards.
The military operation to flush out Bhindrawale and his supporters was ordered by Indira Gandhi.
The assassination of the prime minister was followed by anti-Sikh riots in Delhi.
The magnitude of anti-Sikh riots led to the formation of several militant groups that were determined to achieve “Khalistan”. Prominent among them were Babbar Khalsa, Khalistan Liberation Force, Bhindrawale Tiger Force and Khalistan Commando Force.
From 1984 to 1992, the Sikh militants carried out several attacks, including hijackings and high-profile killings. In 1993, the Indian government launched a brutal counter-offensive against the Sikh separatists, which led many of them to flee India.
Khalistan in diaspora
Many of these Sikhs migrated to Europe, the United States, and Canada, where they established influential and politically active communities. The Sikh diaspora has pushed forward the idea of Khalistan and lobbied for international pressure on India to hold the perpetrators of rights violations against Sikhs accountable.
Canada is home to around 770,000 Sikhs, about two percent of the country's population.
In 2020, many Sikh organisations, including those based in Canada, began to call for a referendum in Indian Punjab to determine the fate of a separate state. They also wanted to take the results of the referendum to the UN. This led to mobilisation among Sikh youth in the diaspora and renewed calls for Khalistan.
Since then, the Indian government has faced accusations of trying to plot assassinations of Sikh activists in the US and Canada.
In 2023, the New York-based Sikh leader Gurpatwant Singh Pannun was the target of an Indian assassination plot.
Washington claimed an Indian national, working with an Indian government official, had attempted to hire a hitman for $100,000 to kill Pannun on American soil. The scheme unravelled because the hitman was an undercover federal agent.
Hardeep Singh Nijjar, a Canadian citizen, wasn't so lucky. He was shot dead on June 18, 2023, by masked gunmen.
After a year-long investigation, Canadian police this week said the assassination plot involved Indian government officials, including diplomats stationed in Canada.
What’s behind the incredible rise of the Turkish defence industry?
Türkiye has transformed into a key player in global defence production, breaking free from its historical dependence on foreign suppliers.
Yusuf Kamadan
Last month, Washington signed a defence pact with the Greek Administration of Southern Cyprus (GASC) drawing concern and criticism in Türkiye. The Cyprus island is divided between the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus (TRNC) and the GASC.
The northern and southern divisions followed ethnic tensions in the 1960s that forced Turkish Cypriots to seek refuge in the north of the island. Ankara had intervened to protect the lives and properties of hundreds of thousands of Turks in Cyprus, where a Greek military junta was trying to exert complete control.
It was this same conflict that saw the US abandon Türkiye, its NATO ally. Instead of coming to its rescue, the US imposed an arms embargo on Türkiye, cutting it off from the supply line of vital arms and ammunition.
The Johnson Letter, sent by US President Lyndon B Johnson to Turkish Prime Minister Ismet Inonu in 1964, warned Türkiye against military intervention in Cyprus. Its harsh tone left a lasting mark on Turkish foreign policy, sowing distrust. The arms embargo that followed Türkiye’s intervention in 1974 underscored its reliance on foreign suppliers and the vulnerabilities this dependency entailed.
“This was a wake-up call,” says Veysel Kurt, Associate Professor at Istanbul Medeniyet University and co-author of 'The Development of the Turkish Defence Industry'. “The response not only shook Türkiye's confidence in the US but also revealed the need to reach the capacity to meet its own needs in the defence industry,” Kurt adds.
Over the following decades, Türkiye moved from importing defence equipment to manufacturing advanced weaponry at home. The push for self-sufficiency accelerated in the last 20 years under President Recep Tayyip Erdogan.
Türkiye moved from importing defence equipment to manufacturing advanced weaponry at home.
At the turn of the century, Türkiye relied on imports for 80 percent of its defence needs. Today, that figure has dropped to 20 percent.
In some areas, particularly in armed drones, Türkiye has become a global leader. Defence exports, which stood at $248 million in 2002, reached $4.39 billion in 2022, including sales of drones, armoured vehicles, and frigates. The budget for 2024 will be two and half times more than the previous year, the Turkish government has indicated.
Several factors have driven Türkiye’s focus on defence, according to Kurt. “Political leadership, collaboration between the public and private sectors, and investment in R&D have all played major roles,” Kurt says. “But the most important factor is the decisiveness of the political leadership.”
A reaction to a changing order
Türkiye’s focus on building domestic defence capacity in the past two decades coincides with the challenges it has faced along its eastern borders and the wider region. It also happened at a time when its Western allies let it down.
For instance, the Bayraktar armed drones attained prominence after they were used against terrorists in Syria during Operation Olive Branch.
Kurt says popular uprisings in the Middle East in 2011, the Syrian civil war, cross-border terrorism, and the US support for PKK/YPG terrorists in Syria are among the factors that shaped Ankara’s defence industry outlook.
Although Türkiye’s NATO allies provided it with weapons, they often withheld key technologies and obstructed the sale of critical components.
“This is the main reason for Türkiye's search for alternatives, especially in strategic weapon systems. For example, the air defence system negotiations with China in 2012 and the procurement of S-400s from Russia in 2017,” says Kurt.
“The failed coup attempt on July 15, 2016, and the US’s refusal to cooperate with Türkiye on addressing the FETO threat further solidified the country’s shift toward a more independent political trajectory.”
Before Türkiye started on the road to self-reliance, it had closely aligned with the Western allies. At times, this worked against its own interests.
A long transformation
Türkiye’s shift toward defence independence is a far cry from its post-World War II policies. After joining NATO in 1952, Türkiye relied heavily on its Western allies for military equipment, relegating itself to the role of a consumer.
“Its accession to NATO in 1952 established foreign actors as its primary defence suppliers, relegating Türkiye to the role of a consumer,” says Kurt. “This meant Ankara was spending a substantial chunk of its budget on buying weapons from other countries up till the 1990s”, he says.
This arrangement came under strain following the Cyprus crisis. In response, Türkiye founded Turkish Aerospace Industries (TAI) in 1973 and ASELSAN in 1975 to institutionalise its defence sector.
However, political instability, military coups, and economic crises in the following decades slowed progress. Under Erdogan, Türkiye’s defence strategy has changed dramatically.
Key defence bodies, including the Defence Industry Council and the Presidency of Defence Industries, now report directly to the president, underscoring the importance Ankara places on this sector.
"The current political leadership views the domestic and national character of the defence industry as a strategic priority, not just a tactical one,” says Kurt.
How the Israel-US axis in Middle East pushed Russia and Iran closer
Moscow and Tehran find common ground as Russia battles the US-led West in Ukraine and Iran face-off with Israel.
Giorgio Cafiero
In the second week of October, Russian President Vladimir Putin and his Iranian counterpart Masoud Pezeshkianﾠmet for the first time at a forum in Turkmenistan commemorating the 18th-century poet Magtymguly Pyragy
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Also at this gathering were the heads of state from Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Pakistan, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan.
But it was the Putin-Pezeshkian meeting which was in the spotlight, highlighting how the Russia-Iran entente remains strong despite some recentﾠtensions over Azerbaijan’s Russia-backed Zangezur corridor.
As both leaders stressed at the meeting, Russia and Iran share similar perspectives on important global issues. Moscow and Tehran see their partnership as key to challenging the Western-led order and accelerating the world’s transition from unipolarity.
On the sidelines of this conference, Putin was quoted as telling Pezeshkian, “We actively work together in the international arena, and our assessments of current events in the world are often very close.”
In response, the Iranian president reportedlyﾠsaid to his Russian counterpart, “Our positions in the world are much closer to each other than to others.”
Help for Iran on the way?
At a time in which Iran is bracing for Israel’s response to Tehran’s two-wave ballistic missileﾠattack, the country is looking to Moscow for greater support.
For Iran, there is no alternative to Russia in terms of a military partner. Tehran will likely seek much from Moscow as hostilities with Israel threaten to escalate.
Tehran will probably try to convince the Kremlin to support non-state actors in the 'Axis of Resistance', such as Yemen’s Houthi movement, and do more to defend Syria from Israeli airstrikes.
What Moscow would do to either help Tehran deter Israel from attacking Iran – or help it respond to such an Israeli attack –is unclear. However, some experts suspect that the Kremlin possibly has a new outlook toward the possibility of Iran becoming a nuclear-armed state.
“At this point, Moscow’s rivalry with Washington and the West is so great that Putin may no longer feel any need to cooperate with them in preventing Iran from acquiring nuclear weapons,” says Mark Katz, professor emeritus at George Mason University.
According to him, Russia is “less fearful of a nuclear Iran than of an Iran with improving relations with the West”.
“Israeli-Iranian hostility serves Putin's interests by preventing even the slim possibility of rapprochement that Pezeshkian's election raised,” he tells TRT World.
However, what Moscow does in practice for Tehran during this period of intensifying hostilities in the Middle East could fall short of Iranian expectations.
Russia will ultimately look after its own interests, and Iran’s leadership might end up somewhat disappointed with the Kremlin.
One key question is whether Russia would equip Iran with Su-35 Flanker fighter jets or S-400s air defence missile systems.
For a considerable amount of time, there has been talk of Moscow doing so. But that has yet to occur.
“Russia does not want a strong Iran, hence its reluctance to provide it with sophisticated weaponry and air defence systems. However, Moscow does not want Iran to disintegrate or its regime to be replaced by a pro-Western government,” says Shireen Hunter, an honorary fellow at the Center for Muslim-Christian Understanding at Georgetown University, who served as an Iranian diplomat before 1979.
“Therefore, it might overcome its reluctance. However, Russia does not want to antagonise Israel. Consequently, I doubt that it would change its position in this regard and supply Iran with sophisticated weaponry,” Hunter tells TRT World.
There is also something to say about Moscow’s balanced geopolitical position in the Gulf between Iran and the Gulf Cooperation Council members, some of which are unlikely to welcome Russian moves that strengthen Iran’s military posture in the Middle East.
Katz says that Putin’s unwillingness to transfer Su-35s or S-400s to Iran was mainly to avoid irritating Saudi Arabia and the UAE in particular.
“(However), I would not be surprised if Putin is now willing to transfer S-400 missiles to Iran as a way of either deterring Israeli attacks or defending Iran against them. Transferring Su-35s to Iran, though, is something Putin might not want to do just yet due to his continued desire to maintain cooperation with Riyadh and Abu Dhabi,” Katz adds.
The Ukraine variable
Although it is unclear how far Putin’s government will go to strengthen Iran’s defence capabilities, it is safe to assume that Russia will continue to see Tehran as an important partner in view of Moscow’s growing hostility with the West. The Ukraine war is an extremely important factor.
When the Trump administrationﾠpulled the US out of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action, commonly referred to as the Iran nuclear deal, in May 2018, Tehran was forced to turn to Moscow.
Those circumstances made Iran quite dependent on Putin’s government. However, because of the extent to which Russia has needed Iranian support in the Ukraine war, Moscow and Tehran’s relationship has become significantly more balanced.
Theﾠdrones and also, according to Washington,ﾠthe close-range ballistic missiles that Iran has provided Russia since 2022 have increased the value which Moscow places on its relationship with Tehran.
Aside from Belarus, no other country has been as supportive of Russia’s “special military operation” in Ukraine as Iran, notes Samuel Ramani, an associate fellow at the Royal United Services Institute.
“It’s quite telling when Aleksandr Dugin and other ultranationalist pundits repeat the old trope that ‘the only friends that Russia has in the world are army, air force, and navy, but now we’ve got Iran, Belarus, and North Korea,’” he tells TRT World, referring to the Russian political philosopher and analyst often referred to as “Putin's brain”.
There are, however, limits as to how far Iran will go to back Russia in Ukraine.
In various ways, Tehran has distanced itself from Moscow’s war in Ukraine while also refusing to recognise the sovereignty of the breakaway regions of Donetsk and Luhansk.
Nonetheless, the hardline elements in Iran voice their agreement with the Kremlin’s argument that NATO’s eastward expansion is to blame for the Ukraine war.
Furthermore, given Russia’s importance to Iran in the face of Western pressure and Israeli hostilities, the chances are good that Tehran will continue supporting Moscow in the Ukraine war.
“It’s clear that Iran is one of Russia’s core military allies and partners in this conflict, and that’s not changing any time soon,” Ramani says.
Ultimately, Putin and Pezeshkian attending the meeting in Ashgabat spoke to the extent to which the two leaders value the partnership between their countries, as well as Moscow and Tehran’s interest in maintaining positive relationships with leaders of Central Asian republics.
Although both Russia and Iran will likely only go so far for the other, it is clear that the Moscow-Tehran entente continues strengthening with growing solidarity between Putin’s government and Pezeshkian’s Iran.
